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Political Succession in China

National Intelligence Estimate

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

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NIE 13-10-82

POLITICAL SUCCESSION IN CHINA

Information available as of 19 July 1982 was used in the preparation of this Estimate.

SECRET

THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.

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The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and the Treasury.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

SCOPE NOTE

This Estimate concentrates (1) on the outlook for political succession in the People's Republic of China (PRC) over the next few years: that is, until 1986 or so; and (2) on the significance of that outlook for the United States. It should be stressed that hard intelligence on certain of these questions is slight, and that many of this Estimate's assessments are accordingly based on the best judgments of the Intelligence Community and of the outside experts who have examined this study. A parallel Estimate now in preparation, NIE 13-7-82, *PRC Prospects for National Development in the 1980s*, examines in detail the outlook for China's development.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The problems China faces are so enormous that regardless of who succeeds Deng Xiaoping, its present tough, de facto boss, most of the major patterns of Chinese politics and policies will continue. China will remain a vast LDC, marked by wariness of commitment and lack of adequate technical skills. Economic development will be halting and uneven. The PRC will tend to remain a closed authoritarian society. The partnership with the United States will continue to be arm's length in character, the question of Taiwan constituting a principal ongoing source of friction.

At the moment, the transfer of political authority to Deng's picked successors, party Chairman Hu Yaobang and Premier Zhao Ziyang, appears to be off to a fairly smooth start. Their succession to top power will nonetheless be subject to numerous hazards: their requirement to achieve demonstrable results; considerable continuing opposition to their bold policies from within the military (PLA), the party, and the bureaucracy; and—especially—their need to establish themselves as national figures with potent top cadre support of their own by the time Deng leaves the scene.

The possibility cannot therefore be excluded that strident or sharply divided regimes might return in China, at the expense of political stability, economic advance, and fairly predictable foreign policy conduct.

On balance, however, the chances favor a succession to power of such officials as Hu and Zhao, and a general continuance by them of fairly pragmatic courses. And, the longer Deng remains active the better the succession prospects of Hu and Zhao. In the short term they would almost certainly have to share power in a collective arrangement of some kind with party elders and a few senior PLA figures. But if Deng remains in power until, say, 1985 or beyond, Hu and Zhao would probably be able to establish themselves as first among equals within the PRC's succession leadership. Thereafter, one or the other of these two figures would become dominant.

It will be of great consequence to US interests that succession in China not jeopardize the strategic benefits the United States derives from its relationships with the PRC. Broad US interests will tend to be

best served if generally pragmatic policies are continued by successors like Hu and Zhao.

Should Hu, Zhao, or other pragmatists indeed come to rule the PRC, they would place continued nationalistic emphasis on the Chinese "motherland," less on ideology. Such a PRC would retain correct—though not necessarily close—relations with the United States, and could be expected to explore ways and means of lessening the level of hostility with the USSR, where a parallel succession process might well also be taking place. A pragmatic regime would nonetheless stop short of basically changing China's anti-Soviet orientation. Should a strident backlash regime come to power, it would probably not lessen the level of hostility with the USSR.

KEY JUDGMENTS

1. The succession of political authority in the People's Republic of China (PRC) is a dynamic, ongoing process: it began some years before the death of Mao Zedong; it continues now; it will not be completed when China's present boss, Deng Xiaoping, leaves the scene. Even then, "succession" in any other than an immediate sense will not have occurred and more leadership permutations will prove necessary before the transition of political authority from Maoist to post-Maoist China can be said to have been fully accomplished.

2. In such an interim succession, most of the vast problems which mark China will continue. So will many of the responses of China's leaders to those problems—regardless of who those leaders may be:

- China will remain a poor, vast LDC that is developing only slowly. There will continue to be a chasm between the PRC's goals and capabilities. Economic development will be halting and uneven.
- China's leaders—any leaders—will meet great difficulty in coping with the residue of Cultural Revolution folly: widespread lethargy and cynicism in the society, a dearth of skilled technicians, and a bureaucracy grown wary of commitment.
- Whatever the degree of development achieved, the PRC will tend to remain a tight, closed, authoritarian society. China's leaders will seek technical assistance from the outside world, but not to such extent as might truly open up China to significant "foreign bourgeois" influences.
- The PRC will still be faced with the problem of how best to deter Soviet power and pressures, and Beijing's leaders—any Chinese leaders—will almost certainly wish to do so without permitting a significantly closer partnership with the United States to displace the present, somewhat arm's length, Sino-US relationship.
- Furthermore, the Taiwan problem is not a transient one, as far as Chinese leaders are concerned. It will continue to be a divisive element between Beijing and Washington, and the possibility cannot be excluded that it might come to be a major variable affecting not only Chinese policies, but Chinese politics and succession as well.

3. It is against such a background that the succession picture in post-Deng China will be played out. For some time Deng has been trying to institutionalize the passing of political authority to his two chief lieutenants, party Chairman Hu Yaobang and Premier Zhao Ziyang. No direct challenges to them exist at present; indeed, the most recent appointments of new officials represent clear victories for Hu, Zhao, and their associates. The succession to top authority of Hu and Zhao will nonetheless remain a somewhat fragile proposition.

— Even though their patron, Deng, is well on his way to packing the PRC's governing apparatus with his own people, this tough party veteran does not himself enjoy an unchallenged position. He will continue to have to operate within the confines of collective leadership, and will again have to retreat when he provokes too much opposition from more cautious and conservative leaders.

— Such opposition to Deng's radical changes will remain considerable, albeit often muted and foot-dragging in character. The principal sources of such opposition will continue to be certain old guard leaders in the PLA (China's military, the People's Liberation Army), certain party leaders (national and provincial) brought to power during the Cultural Revolution years, and China's gigantic, lethargic bureaucracy.

— Economic collapse or a major failure of the PRC's present development programs are improbable, but Deng must solidify the position of his heirs sufficiently in the relatively short actuarial time available to him, so that political succession can pass in an orderly manner.

— Hazards abound, and if Deng, Hu, and Zhao do not bring demonstrable improvement to the life of China they could become the skeptics' newest scapegoats. This danger will exist even though this problem may be primarily a symbolic one: that is, not so much that the policies of Deng and his associates must succeed in bringing a specific degree of actual progress in this or that aspect of development, but that failure to achieve reasonable progress will give various rivals political weapons with which to contest the nailing down of political dominance by Deng and his associates.

— Their succession will hang in important measure on how well they have established themselves as national figures with potent top cadre support of their own by the time Deng dies, becomes incapacitated, or leaves the scene.

4. Should Deng depart in the relatively near future (over the next year or so), Hu and Zhao would almost certainly have to share power, probably in a collective arrangement of some kind with party elders and a few senior military (PLA) figures.

5. Should Deng remain in power for a longer period (say, 1985 or beyond), then Hu and Zhao would probably be able to establish themselves, at least initially, as first-among-equals within the PRC's successor leadership.

— No confident estimates are justified as to what would occur then, for, in addition to the domestic and foreign circumstances of the time, the question would soon arise as to whether the succession of Hu and Zhao was to be one of shared authority, or of one superior to the other partner, or of just one leader alone.

— There are countless precedents in Chinese history for just one leader, and some precedents (imperial, republican, and PRC) for a prime technician associated with the boss—the most recent example, Mao and Zhou Enlai. Zhao Ziyang has some of the makings of a Zhou Enlai. But Zhao is a tough, able official who might outlast Hu. One thing is clear: there are no examples in Chinese history of truly shared top authority.

6. In any event, should the succession process elevate Hu, Zhao, or other pragmatists to top positions, such a PRC would place continued emphasis on China and the Chinese "motherland," less on ideology. It would continue to open itself up somewhat to foreign technology and presence—but only to a limited degree. It would keep its basic ties with the United States, but would continue to distance itself somewhat from us, to bargain toughly, to criticize many US policies, and increasingly to identify itself with the Third World. As part of this process, such a succession regime would probably explore ways and means of lessening the present level of hostility with the USSR—although stopping short of basically changing China's anti-Soviet orientation.

7. On balance, the chances favor a fairly manageable succession of power to such officials as Hu and Zhao, and a general continuance by them of fairly pragmatic PRC courses, at home and abroad. Further, it is clear that virtually all PRC leaders wish to avoid a return to the extremes of the Cultural Revolution. Nonetheless, given the enormity of China's problems, and the many adverse contingencies that might affect China's politics and policies over the next few years, the possibility cannot be excluded that intense instability might return in some new forms. Some combination of critical economic setbacks or political factionalism could occur over the next few years that would bring to

power strident or sharply divided regimes of some kind which would cut back sharply on the generally pragmatic courses Deng, Hu, and Zhao champion. In such circumstances China's development prospects would suffer, Beijing's behavior would be more difficult to anticipate, Sino-US relations would almost certainly be further set back, and the Soviets would be given new opportunities to try to exploit China's vulnerabilities. Such a Chinese backlash regime, however, would probably not lessen the level of hostility with the USSR.

8. The United States will have considerable stake in the outcome of political succession in China. It will be of great consequence to US interests that the transfer of political authority there not jeopardize the strategic benefits the United States derives from its relationships with the PRC. Broad US interests will tend to be best served if generally pragmatic policies are continued by successors like Hu and Zhao.

9. The United States will almost certainly not be able to exert direct or significant influence on political succession in the PRC. There will nonetheless be opportunity for American officials to take a number of creative initiatives that can indirectly influence Chinese politics and policies. More important, the United States can inadvertently injure the political positions of those PRC leaders of most interest to us and so give the Soviets opportunities to fish in any troubled Sino-US waters.

10. Indeed, Soviet considerations will certainly interact with the working out of future Chinese politics and policies. The transferring of political authority in the PRC will be accompanied by a parallel process in the USSR. The successors of Brezhnev will probably not seek a genuine or full Sino-Soviet reconciliation, but they may see profit in some lessening of the level of hostility with the PRC. Meanwhile, even though Beijing's leaders will continue to view the American connection as a necessary adjunct to the PRC's development, the value to them of that connection will continue to hang importantly on their perceptions of the degree to which US world policies vis-a-vis the USSR benefit the PRC's security and strategic interests.

[redacted]

DISCUSSION

A. The Significance of the Succession Question

The question of China after Deng is of as much concern and is as much a puzzle to the cadre in China as it is to Western China watchers.

[redacted]

1. The succession of political authority that Deng Xiaoping has arranged must be considered a fragile phenomenon even though he and his associates have of late been successfully salting the PRC's governing bureaucracies with their own people. Myriad problems hazard an effective transition of authority to Deng's heirs presumptive, party Chairman Hu Yaobang and Premier Zhao Ziyang. The problems Deng and his successors face are so enormous and so ingrained in the system and society he has inherited from Mao Zedong, that they will not be quickly exorcised by new reformist Chinese policies, whatever their character and whoever their champion.

2. In the broadest sense China has been seeking a system of political succession ever since the collapse of imperial authority there. Today the succession of political authority in the PRC remains a dynamic, ongoing process. It began some years before the death of Mao; it will not be completed when Deng leaves the scene. Regardless of what leaders succeed him, "succession" in any other than an immediate sense will not have occurred and more leadership permutations may prove necessary before the transition of political authority from Maoist to post-Maoist China can be said to have been fully accomplished.

3. No observers—American, Soviet, or other—will really know how a new China is going to influence the world, for good or ill, until changes yet to come have transformed present-day China. Succession in this dynastic sense is doubtless decades away. What mainland China therefore faces in the near term is another interim transfer of political authority, within a continuing much longer period of full succession.

4. For this interim period the fairly pragmatic policies of Deng, Hu, Zhao, and their associates give the Chinese perhaps their best chance since the mid-1950s to deal with China's many problems and to help create a strengthened, more modern society. Available evidence, however, makes it difficult to be very sanguine about any leaders' success in achieving China's ambitious goals in the near future. At best, chances during that period favor only partial successes scattered here and there in the economic life of China. The problems now facing Deng and his associates— and indeed all of China's leaders— are staggering. With a vast population of over a billion, China is still largely a poor and backward society, by far the world's largest LDC. Its slow agricultural growth in relation to population (agricultural output is only 7 percent higher than in 1957) barely keeps pace with current levels of per capita consumption. Its per capita GNP is a mere US $256 (estimated). Its energy resource development is lagging. It does not have the capacity rapidly to modernize itself alone. It has only limited means of attracting foreign capital or paying for needed commodities and technology from abroad.

5. The succession to Deng will be played out against a backdrop that includes not only problems which the PRC shares with many other of the world's LDCs, but also numerous difficulties unique to the PRC. Foremost is the scale of the development task facing China and the audacity of the goals successive leaders have set; the PRC has come a long way, but it has a long way to go. Also, China—including Deng's China—is still a suspicious, closed society which in many respects purposely cuts itself off from the world. China's leaders are economically unable and politically hesitant to permit large numbers of foreign technicians and plants into China. These leaders continue a hostile relationship with the USSR that demands maintaining a Chinese military establishment of considerable proportions. China needs vast scores of skilled administrators and technicians, yet the Cultural Revolution has cost China nearly a generation's worth of trained administrators, professionals, and technicians.

6. Moreover, party turmoil in China over the past three decades has devoured much of its own leader-

[redacted]

ship. Cadres at all levels whose policies later go sour cannot only be pulled down, but can then be damned for having been wrong all along. The resulting mass confusion and intimidation has traumatized wide sectors of China's population, made them wary of commitment, and alienated them from the rhetoric of politics. This process has sapped the regime's ability to generate unique energies once again from the people—as Mao did so well at the PRC's outset. The most grievous damage these processes have wrought is widespread individual cynicism, indolence, and disregard for society at large.

The intellectual professional class . . . is now a very cautious group. It will contribute its expertise when asked, but it is seldom creative or innovative. A scientist or technician trained in the West, for example, may see a number of ways of improving a process or creating a new method of dealing with a particular technical problem. He will not volunteer this, however, for fear of being criticized or persecuted at some future time.

7. To this situation Deng Xiaoping brings remarkable resiliency. This tough veteran of party infighting has climbed back to the top from three purgings. He has worked his will on a reluctant bureaucracy and military, even though they in turn have forced him to back off on many goals and paces of advance. In the Chinese case, Deng is attempting to create what is in fact clearly a revisionist Communist regime and society. And, Chinese leadership has ceased damning the USSR for being "revisionist"—the present Soviet sins having become "bureaucratism" and "social imperialism."

8. Deng must solidify the top position of his heirs sufficiently in the relatively short actuarial time available to him, so that political succession can pass in an orderly manner. Hazards abound, and if Deng, Hu, and Zhao do not continue to bring some demonstrable improvement to the life of China they could become the skeptics' newest scapegoats. The history of the PRC shows that China's leaders and people can tolerate considerable economic setback and disarray. The need for some progress in the present context of political succession is not so much an economic problem, however, as it is a symbolic one: that is, not so much that the policies of Deng and his associates must succeed in bringing a specific degree of actual progress in this or that aspect of development, but that failure to achieve reasonable progress will give various rivals political weapons with which to contest the nailing down of political dominance by Deng and his associates.

9. Succession will not hinge alone on measurable economic success, technical considerations, or even the personal political power positions achieved. For all their skill, the political style of Deng and his associates is in certain respects an alien one to most Chinese, for in so freely acknowledging the weaknesses of China and its need of outside support these leaders risk injuring Chinese pride and provoking widespread resentments among the Chinese. This is a terribly sharp break from what Mao provided China: for with all his drawbacks and changes of line Mao did call up an intangible but very real strength in the makeup of the Chinese, their traditional ethnocentrism and sense of moral superiority. Such sentiments still dominate not only the bulk of China's huge population, but the party itself, which expanded rapidly during the Cultural Revolution.

The hundreds of thousands of middle-level cadres promoted during the Cultural Revolution pose the major threat to Deng's present policies.

10. That Deng has brought some order to the PRC's politics and is attempting to restructure China's government and to arrange for succession attests to the skill with which he has fashioned an exquisite balancing of political forces. The fate of his successors will be largely determined by the working out of domestic currents, as has been the case with all Chinese leaders. But as foreign influences helped shape events in imperial and republican China, so foreign influences—particularly Soviet and US—will to some degree affect political leadership and succession in the PRC.

B. The Present Leadership Situation

The Setting

11. There is no question that Deng Xiaoping remains the PRC's foremost leader and policymaker, even though he now operates more from behind the scenes. He is the acknowledged driving force behind implementation of the "four modernizations."[1] The present mainline policies continue to reflect Deng's desired programs, as do the present ambitious efforts to streamline the bureaucracy and pack it with more responsive officials. The recently promulgated draft Constitution is a gain for Deng and his associates, as are the particular namelists of new officials appointed or promoted. Deng and his close associates have the initiative; others react to them and their policies.

12. There are nonetheless definite limits to Deng's influence. He cannot be compared to Mao in political stature. Deng is obliged to share power with other leaders and to operate in the context of collective leadership rather than dictating policy—as demonstrated by the numerous retreats Deng has had to make in the last few years when he provoked staunch opposition from the more cautious and conservative. The constraints on his authority have been registered in many ways. It took over a year (and six revisions) to produce the mid-1981 Sixth Plenum's authoritative Resolution, which among other things set forth the present gospel on how to think—at least at the moment—about Mao and his mistakes. Deng has joined conservative party and military leaders in sharply delimiting the earlier area of permissible criticism of the regime. Deng was unable to submit the revised state constitution to the National People's Congress in December 1981, as had been originally scheduled. The delay almost certainly involved ongoing discord over such key issues as setting forth the formal relation of the party to the state, naming a chief of state and a commander in chief of the PLA, and in particular determining the command relationships among the PLA, the party, and the government.

13. Indeed, the limits to Deng's authority were clearly registered in Deng's having had himself to assume the post of Chairman of the party's Military Commission in 1981 after considerable, undisguised opposition had developed within the PLA to the idea of giving that position to Hu Yaobang, as Deng had wished. In fact, until such time as Deng and his associates are able to resolve this central question of who and what command the PLA there will be a major missing equation in Deng's ability to nail down an orderly succession of political authority. Deng will meanwhile have to be careful not to allow his sometimes abrasive and impetuous manner damage his goals, especially since, at age 77, he is in an overall sense less a successor Mao than a transitional leader endeavoring to channel ultimate political succession in directions of his own choosing.

14. It is from such a position of primus inter pares that Deng is seeking to reorder the Chinese Communist regime. Even as now cut back in scope, the "modernization" development programs comprise a fairly ambitious effort across the board. Perhaps more ambitious are certain of Deng's accompanying measures designed to provide the political and social prerequisites for China's economic and technical development. Here Deng and his associates are seeking to create substantial changes in the regime's ideology, organization, and policies. These leaders are:

- Trying to restructure a more effective, professional bureaucracy, in the process attempting to neutralize or bypass ineffective or recalcitrant organs of the party, the government, and the PLA—of course, packing these ranks meanwhile with reformist supporters.
- Separating technical and administrative functions and organizations from party ones, in so doing creating more specialization of function and fewer multiple portfolios.
- Revising official interpretations of the PRC's myth figure, Mao Zedong, and of his political philosophy.
- Trying to create a more formalized legal system.
- Sending many elite specialists abroad for training.
- Upgrading China's educational system, so abused in the years of the Cultural Revolution.

15. Perhaps most important, Deng and his lieutenants are now taking the drastic step of trying sharply

[1] The term, "four modernizations," refers to the present leadership's program of comprehensive national development, under way for some four years, to upgrade the quantity and quality of production in agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense.

and explicitly to cut back the swollen ranks of the PRC's civilian and military bureaucracies.[2] This is a gamble, for this ambitious effort to cut out dead wood, the overaged, and the recalcitrant will meet considerable resistance. In this scheme of Deng's the party is to remain supreme but less visible, and with its role reduced: it is no longer to monopolize all of China's life as before, but is to share influence more than it has with the state apparatus and with new, alternative bodies concerning science, technology, economics, administration, and military matters.

16. These new arrangements reflect the broad political setting in which the leadership and succession dramas are being played out in China. Most important, Mao is gone, and with him many of the patterns which characterized politics in the Maoist PRC. The extremes of earlier debate and factionalism have been narrowed. There is more confidence and less paranoia present among elements of the PRC's leadership: for example, there is less concern about the imminence of military attack by the USSR; there is satisfaction that China has now been widely accepted as a major power; and there is a hope that China's leaders have made the Cultural Revolution a thing of the past. The focus of much of China's domestic political attention has meanwhile shifted to improving the quality of life in the PRC, and in the regime's present effort to create what it calls "spiritual socialism" in China.

17. It should be noted that such new characteristics mark the Beijing and the top leadership scenes much more than they do the broad provincial and rural settings which still contain the bulk of China's population and officialdom. With certain exceptions—Guangdong and Shanghai, for example—traditional roots are much stronger in the provinces, patterns more set, bureaucrats more wary, and skepticism of great new national initiatives more pronounced. "Succession" will certainly not be worked out alone by competing players in Beijing, but in interaction with growing institutional interests there and throughout the country, and with greater influence exerted from provincial and local levels.

> . . . in building a spiritual civilization, we must make an effort to achieve a decisive turnaround in law and order, social attitudes and our Party's conduct . . . relations among ethnic groups and in their solidarity as well . . . we are all very critical of those movies with unhealthy boy-meets-girl themes, we cannot let them be supreme. . . . If we want our nation to have a highly advanced spiritual civilization we must . . . keep at it for years until spiritual civilization becomes a household word.
>
> Party Chairman Hu Yaobang,

The Principal Players

18. ***Deng's Putative Successors.*** While Deng has not named Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang his designated successors, by making them party Chairman and Premier, respectively, and by according increasing responsibilities to them, Deng has in fact arranged an implicit succession scheme which the Chinese clearly recognize. The outcome of this succession scheme of course remains uncertain. Hu and Zhao are both officials of considerable ability, but Zhao has gained his experience primarily at the provincial level, and neither is as yet widely known in his own right as a national figure nor are they apparently backed up by extensive senior cadre support of their own. At the moment they remain satellites of and front men for Deng. They have been increasingly called upon to make authoritative statements for Deng, but it is noteworthy that in so doing they have been careful thus far generally to invoke Deng's name or that of the party's Central Secretariat in laying down what the official line is to be on key issues.

19. Of the two, party Chairman Hu Yaobang (now about 66) has been a close associate of Deng since the 1940s, far longer than has Zhao. Hu gained much of his early experience in Deng's home base, Sichuan Province, then had years of senior party assignments in Beijing, was purged during the Cultural Revolution and again in 1976, together with Deng, and at last was

[2] There are no reliable figures on the total size of the PRC's officeholders, party and government, at the national, provincial, and local levels. The Chinese Communist Party is known to number some 38 million at present, of whom 20 million have joined since the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Deng Xiaoping and his associates are currently cutting back the number of officeholders in both (1) the *government* apparatus—reducing the number of ministers and vice ministers, for example, from 505 to 167, bureau and department heads from 2,450 to 1,348; and (2) the *party* apparatus—reducing the total staff by 17.3 percent. There have been a few recent public statements that Deng and his associates propose to reduce the total size of the party.

rehabilitated and elected to the Politburo in 1978 and to General Secretary of the party in 1980. A sometimes self-effacing official, Hu concentrates on rebuilding a party wracked by the Cultural Revolution. In so doing he appears to enjoy Deng's full trust. He is, however, a more controversial figure than is Zhao: Hu evokes hearty dislike from some of the party and certain of China's intellectuals, and he is not held in high regard by many military figures. Also, at times Hu displays a hyperactive manner that would go less well as a leader than, at present, as a lieutenant. His experience in foreign affairs appears to be fairly limited thus far.

20. By contrast, Premier Zhao Ziyang (now 62) is a smooth, urbane official who generally projects an attractive image and self-confident manner. He comes from a privileged background and served as an agricultural expert and then party first secretary in Guangdong Province before being purged in 1967 in the Cultural Revolution. Rehabilitated in 1971, he was stationed in Inner Mongolia until April 1972, when Zhou Enlai transferred him to Guangdong Province and then—in late 1975—to Sichuan Province, where Zhao became the top party and government official. Zhao gained repute in Guangdong and Sichuan, deservedly or not, for successfully introducing a number of far-reaching improvements in agricultural production, economic integration, administrative decision-making, and the combining of agricultural, industrial, and commercial enterprises—indeed almost prototypes of certain of the measures he and Deng have since initiated at the national level. He became a full Politburo member in 1979, and Premier in 1980. He has traveled to Europe, the Near East, Southeast Asia, and Japan, and has had occasional responsibility in the past for foreign policy or military matters. His foreign policy role seems clearly to be on the increase, marked especially by his recent meetings with Tokyo's leaders. Essentially a technocrat and administrator to date, Zhao is a skilled and valuable expert, not yet the holder of prime political power. He has certain of the attributes of a Zhou Enlai, but Zhao's principal asset at the moment remains the support of Deng, whose trust was early shown in him when in 1975 Deng made him the top man in Deng's own home base of power, Sichuan—just a very few years after Zhao had been paraded in the streets as a Cultural Revolution enemy of the people.

21. The party and government reorganization and personnel changes announced in May 1982 clearly strengthen Hu's and Zhao's position in the bureaucracy. The streamlining of government, in particular, generally promoted men who share their views, and some, like Vice Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian and Secretary General of the State Council Du Xingyuan, have close personal ties to Hu and Zhao respectively. Just as important, a number of men who could be expected to challenge Hu and Zhao or their policies in a succession fight lost some of their access to the bureaucracy. Specifically, some 28 past associates of Hu can now be identified at very senior national party or government posts.[3] Unlike Hu's associates, Zhao's are generally in economic and technical ministries and not in positions of great political power. Zhao nonetheless does enjoy contacts with a few very senior officials, the venerable Ye Jianying for one, which Hu does not. As significant as these gains are for Hu and Zhao, however, they are little more than a beginning. They must further strengthen their grip on the bureaucracy, especially over such control organs as the party Organization Department and the Central Discipline Inspection Commission. They must also cultivate or place supporters in key military positions.

The general view of Zhao is one of approval, but he is not considered as outstanding as Hu Yaobang. . . . It is not clear where the power bases of these two leaders are located.

[redacted]

Of the two men Zhao is more likely than Hu to become the dominant leader after Deng. This is because, for the remainder of the present decade, the emphasis will probably be on improving the economy and reforming the state apparatus—two areas where Zhao has had more influence. . . . In addition, Zhao seems to have a stronger will and determination than Hu, and therefore would be the likely victor in any political showdown between the two leaders.

[redacted]

[3] That is, directors or deputy directors of Central Committee organizations, officials of the State Council, ministers or vice ministers, ambassadors, or senior members of the Chinese Academies of Sciences or of Social Sciences. See annex B for details.

Table 1

Numbers of Associates of Party Chairman Hu Yaobang and Premier Zhao Ziyang Who Are Known Currently To Hold Major National-Level Positions

	Hu	Zhao
CCP Secretariat	1	0
State Councilor	1[a]	0
Director, CCP Central Committee organization	4[b]	1
Deputy Director, CCP Central Committee organization	5	1
Adviser, CCP Central Committee organization	1	0
Minister	3	2
Vice Minister	6	5[c]
Secretary General, State Council	0	1[d]
Deputy Secretary General, State Council	1	1
Adviser, State Council	0	1
Vice Chairman, National People's Congress	1	0
Official, State Council organization	1	2
Ambassador	2	0
Official, Chinese Academy of Sciences/Academy of Social Sciences	2	0
	28	14

[a] Huang Hua, concurrently Minister of Foreign Affairs.

[b] Includes: Yang Jingren, concurrently Director, United Front Work Department and Minister in Charge, State Nationalities Affairs Commission; and Feng Wenbin, concurrently Chairman, Commission for Collecting Party Historical Data, Deputy Director, Party History Research Center, and Vice President, Central Party School.

[c] Includes Li Guangxiang, Vice Minister of Public Security; and He Kang, concurrently Vice Minister, State Planning Commission, and Vice Minister of Agriculture.

[d] Du Xingyuan, concurrently Vice Minister, State Commission for Restructuring the Economy.

Table 2

Numbers of Associates of Party Chairman Hu Yaobang and Premier Zhao Ziyang Who Are Known Currently To Hold Senior Provincial-Level Positions

	Hu	Zhao
First Secretary	3	1
Secretary/Deputy Secretary	7	12
Governor	0	2
Mayor	1	0
Vice Governor	3	9
Director, CCP Committee organization	0	1
Deputy Director, CCP Committee organization	0	1
Vice Chairman, People's Congress	0	2
Director, Government organization	0	4
Deputy Political Commissar, Military Region	0	1
Deputy Commander, Military Region	0	1
	14	34

22. Another chief political lieutenant of Deng's who may figure prominently in the succession picture is Wan Li (about 65), now a member of the party's Central Secretariat and the senior vice premier. He was one of only two of the original 13 vice premiers to retain his position, and he is one of the few political figures who still hold both senior party and government posts. A close associate of Deng's since the 1950s, Wan was purged twice by the Maoists. He has a reputation as an excellent administrator.

23. Deng's principal lieutenant for military matters is Yang Dezhi (now about 71), currently PLA Chief of Staff, having succeeded Deng in that position in February 1980. He is not only the PLA's ranking officer, but serves on two major policymaking bodies of the party (the Secretariat and the Military Commission) and is in addition a Vice Minister of Defense. Deng has long had military and political confidence in Yang, who now supports Deng's policies within the PLA. Also, Yang has had greater contact with the outside world than have most of the PLA's top officers. The FRC's Defense Minister, Geng Biao, is an associate of Deng's, but is essentially a functionary and does not appear to be a person of particular ability or stature.

24. ***The "Moderates."*** Among the disparate and unorganized skeptics of Deng's policies are a number of distinguished old guard leaders, many of whom continue to have leading roles in China's economic life and political life. These leaders worry less about the direction of Deng's reforms than their pace and scope. They are concerned lest his drastic reforms undermine the party's prestige and position in Chinese society and impact adversely on China's social order.

25. Prominent among such figures is party elder Chen Yun (about 78), whose responsibilities include overall long-term economic planning, organization work, and party work style. He is influential with various factions because he has never been an assertive rival of anyone's. Active in the party since the 1920s, and a top leader off and on since the 1950s, Chen continues to side with Deng at various junctures, and

shares Deng's desires to reverse many of the Cultural Revolution's legacies, to moderate the myth of Mao, and to draw pragmatically from a variety of economic models. He nonetheless is a more orthodox Communist economic planner and represents a separate stream within the top leadership at present. He often goes along with Deng but on occasion regards him as too venturesome and not sufficiently committed to strong central control of the economy.

As far as prestige is concerned, the standings of Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun are the highest in the leadership. In certain respects Chen's standing is even higher than Deng's. Everyone admires Chen's personal style.

[redacted]

26. More clearly independent, though in sharply failing health, has been another party elder, Li Xiannian (about 75). Until 1980, he was China's second-ranking vice premier, senior economic planner, and the vice premier with the longest continuous service. As fifth-ranking party leader, he has frequently stood in for Deng on formal occasions, and has considered himself Deng's equal. Li's strength in part has stemmed from his long service and his role as spokesman for central economic ministries that stand to lose influence if Deng and Chen succeed in decentralizing economic decisionmaking. Li's political fortunes have been in decline since 1980, and he now is critically ill and inactive. Li himself is unlikely to pose serious problems for Hu and Zhao much longer, but other advocates of strong central planning and Soviet-style economic development are still present in the leadership and will fight rearguard actions.

27. ***The Political and Military Opponents of Deng and His Associates.*** A loose coalition exists whose dissimilar members argue for a limited return to the past. These groupings of officials, who often have little in common other than a mutual skepticism concerning Deng and his reform measures, include, respectively: (a) the surviving Cultural Revolution remnants who formerly centered around Mao's apparent designated successor, Hua Guofeng; (b) certain "conservative" old guard party and security service elements who would prefer a more Stalinist PRC; and (c) certain elements of the conservative military hierarchy. None of these figures champions a return to a new Cultural Revolution, but together they do constitute a considerable body of doubt about the wisdom and pace of Deng's "reformist" policies, more skeptical and more doctrinaire than Chen Yun and other of the "moderates" discussed above.

28. For his part, Hua has had to relinquish his two former supreme posts to Deng's handpicked successors—the premiership to Zhao and the party chairmanship to Hu. And since giving up those positions in 1980-81, Hua has suffered further setbacks and is now the lowest ranking member of the Politburo's Standing Committee. Hua retains some residual strength in the middle levels of the bureaucracy, but he has never been able to build a strong personal base of support among key figures, his fortunes seem clearly to be declining, and, unless a succession crisis should occur in the near future, Hua's chances of playing a significant post-Deng role will probably dissipate.

[Hua Guofeng] is a pleasing enough man with a good reputation for irrigation ditches.

[redacted]

29. Significant opposition to Deng's broad reform programs comes from certain military elements. Opposition to Deng from within the PLA is not constant, total, or cohesive; it varies from issue to issue and, from time to time. Many PLA leaders understand why military modernization has been given a lower priority in Deng's programs, and they also support his efforts to gain Western military technology and to modernize and regularize the PLA. Certain of the younger PLA elements are themselves reformist, and in any case are eager to replace the old guard leaders who have dominated the PLA for so long. Many leading elements of the PLA nonetheless constitute a bulwark of conservative constraint. Deng has blunted earlier sharp PLA criticism by moving in the past year to take greater account of PLA views and interests, but the sources of discontent among PLA leaders are deep-seated and many, among them:

— Since the mid-1960s, some elements of the PLA played a key political role: the high command of

[redacted]

the PLA became the "guardian" of the political, social, and economic status quo during the Cultural Revolution, and afterwards it openly and bluntly spoke of its role as the guardian of the "correct" political line. This political role eroded during the 1970s and has accelerated under Deng. He has pressed the PLA to give up its political role and concentrate instead on performing its professional duties.

-- Some PLA figures are displeased that military matters have the lowest priority in China's "modernization" programs, and that economic emphasis has shifted from heavy industry to agriculture and light industry.

— Some PLA leaders consider Deng's semi-liberalizing of public debate a threat to army rank-and-file discipline and to social order. They feel that Deng has carried criticism of Mao too far, and they point to events in Poland as an example of the unforeseen disasters that can flow from radical changes such as Deng's. Such PLA leaders similarly consider that his policies permit far too many "dangerous foreign influences" to undermine the patriotism and moral fiber of China's youth.

— Many PLA leaders have had trouble with Deng over bread-and-butter issues. Agricultural reforms stirred resentment when the dependents of military men were forced to rely on their own efforts rather than support from the communes in which they live, a real disadvantage with their able-bodied men away in the service. The party made special efforts to improve this situation, only to be faced with new resistance from within the PLA to forced retirements and demobilizations. Senior officers remain reluctant to surrender the perquisites that come only with rank and authority.

30. It should be noted that except for some disgruntlement over what certain PLA leaders consider Deng's "too soft" tactics toward Washington's Taiwan policies, there seem to be few significant differences at present between Deng and PLA leaders over foreign policy questions. The same appears to apply with respect to security and strategic issues: that is, how best to defend China against military attack. Also, Deng derives support from within the PLA on certain issues. He has some backing, for example, from PLA leaders who desire a more professional army along modern lines, with a restored rank system, less party control, and an emphasis on quality over quantity; and who agree with the need to limit military expenditures in the short term in order to provide more resources for China's modernization programs. These supporters believe that, once a suitable economic infrastructure has been erected with foreign technical assistance, China can later proceed to accord greater attention to developing its military power along more modern lines. This thread of reasoning has a long history in the PLA extending back to the 1950s; it was overshadowed during the Cultural Revolution when Mao's doctrine of People's War held full sway, with its stress on a more politicized army with greater party control. Today's PLA "modernists" are endeavoring to move Deng more clearly into a position which holds that the doctrine of People's War must take into account the military realities of the late 20th century.

> . . . the situation in PLA leadership . . . [is] extremely disorganized. [He] suggested that many among his contemporaries in the Army hierarchy were scrambling about seeking the means to protect their positions from the impending rectification campaign which threatens to force many of them into retirement.
>
> [redacted]

31. Ye Jianying, a revered military leader who chairs the PRC's National People's Congress and holds other leading party and military posts, symbolizes the attempt of old-guard military leaders to maintain the PLA's prestige, and has exercised significant constraining influence within both the Army and the Politburo. On the other hand, he has supported Deng's call for reform of the bureaucracy despite what that will entail for senior PLA leaders. Ye could reappear to thwart a particularly contentious Dengist reform, or other PLA figures might attempt to do so in his name, but for the moment Ye appears content to withdraw from active political maneuvering. In any event he is in failing health, and may no longer be able to constitute a direct political force.

32. ***The Dissidents.*** By the regime's admission, some 2 to 5 percent of China's population are outspoken disaffected critics, dismayed that Deng and his

[redacted]

associates have not gone further than they have in condemning Mao's excesses, permitting freer discussion in China, and the like. Party Chairman Hu Yaobang has dismissed them, outwardly at least, as "monkey-like clowns." But old Ye Jianying has cautioned that, if there are 2 percent of China's 1 billion people who fit this category, this still means that the regime has millions of dissenters with which to deal. These dissidents are at present a disparate lot without organization, power, or coherent program; they have been silenced for the moment, and they seem unlikely in the near future to have any effect on national policies. Their criticisms have nonetheless been intense. They have struck some responsive chords among the public. They may come to influence some of the PRC's urban policies. And, since many of these dissidents are youths, their grievances in time will come to constitute a considerably greater problem to China's leadership than they do at present—and especially so if the well educated among them are not constructively absorbed into the system in the meantime.

In another poem ... [this dissident] imagined a scene in which Chairman Mao Zedong met Adolf Hitler in the afterworld. Hitler shook Mao's hand and patted him on the shoulder, saying "You did a good job." Such sarcasm is unacceptable ... what these people want is bourgeois liberalism.

Paraphrased remarks of Deng Xiaoping,

A number of Chinese students recently expressed uniformly harsh judgments on China's political system and leadership.... [These students were a privileged group but] their statements did not strike us as inconsistent with what we have heard from other students and they described their attitudes as widespread among their fellow students. Following is a composite of their remarks.... Most Chinese youth must mask their true feelings on political and cultural matters, because of pressures to conform to an official line which they widely disbelieve.... Bureaucratic reform is a good idea, but won't make any difference, because the same people who have dominated the senior positions will continue to do so.... Political studies classes, which all students are required to take, are a complete waste of time.... If something is printed in the *People's Daily*, most students automatically assume that it's a lie.

The Nature of the Opposition Deng Xiaoping Faces

33. The situation is not so much one of maneuvering for power by particular factions or top leaders, one of whom may ultimately unseat Deng and his associates, as it is of his being circled by a host of constraints on his freedom of action and leadership potential. Some of these constraints exist among the top leadership, although most such opposition at present takes the form of hesitance or braking action, rather than head-on collision, and it comes generally on certain specific issues, with sometimes differing or shifting coalitions of leaders. Other, more fundamental constraints arise from China's great basic problems and would similarly face any Chinese leader. Still other constraints stem more from the specific circumstances of Deng's particular position and policies: of these, great "opposition" to Deng comes simply from the skepticism present among the millions of civilians and military officials throughout the country who comprise China's governing cadres. Unless Deng can

The problem of rejuvenating cadre work style is the most difficult one facing Deng, since it is doubtful whether the old injunctions to work hard and sacrifice oneself for the Socialist cause will ever reignite the elan of earlier days.

.... There are too many people doing nothing ... all of this has reached an absolutely intolerable state ... we lack regular methods of employing, rewarding and punishing, retiring, dismissing and getting rid of cadres; all of them have an iron ricebowl, no matter how well or how badly they perform.

Deng Xiaoping, August 1980, to an enlarged meeting of the CCP's Politburo (*Hong Kong Chan Wang*, 16 April 1981)

succeed in overcoming inertia, imparting constructive momentum, and weeding out vast layered fiefdoms, they may have the power to thwart his initiatives and those of his successors.

C. Leadership in the 1980s

34. Particular personalities, factions, and policies aside, China's continuing basic problems will face all of China's leaders alike, will affect their political succession, and will in turn be affected by that succession. These basic issues, which in a sense set the framework for the working out of succession, are these:

- How are China's leaders to bridge the chasm between the PRC's goals and capabilities?
- How can China's leaders lead if the giant machineries of state do not follow?
- How can a discredited party mobilize China's population—and especially its alienated youth—to create a great new China of tomorrow?
- How can China's leaders relax authoritarian controls, in an effort to spur the nation's creativity and productivity, without setting loose forces which—as in Poland—may further undermine the ruling party's authority?
- How can a relatively weak China best ensure national security?

35. Given such formidable problems, there will almost certainly be some continuing, shifting combinations of leaders, and some continuing cyclical swings between relative freedom and relative repression. In this situation the outside world should be prepared for the possibility that succession in China could take any of many forms: a continuation of more-or-less present Dengist leadership; a somewhat more cautious regime such as that represented, say, by Chen Yun; a compromise leadership, forced by adverse circumstance, in which stagnation and repression might become keynotes; the avowedly ideological perspectives of a neo-Maoist regime; or even an explicitly PLA regime.

36. Hu and Zhao still have a long way to go before they will be able to stand alone. The policy changes they symbolize may possibly be beaten down. And in any case the sooner Deng dies or falls, the greater the difficulty they will have in dominating a succession situation:

- If Deng should die, become incapacitated, or leave the scene in the very near future, say, over the next year or so, the first impulse of PRC leaders would probably be an assessing of how successful and acceptable his new measures had been. China might turn inward for a period, with somewhat of a vacuum developing in foreign policy making. Any one of a number of successors, or successive successors, might come to power in such a period of drift. And it cannot be excluded that in such circumstances an ideologically motivated leadership might come to the fore.
- It is more likely, however, that a collective succession of some kind would result, a grouping which included Hu and Zhao, Chen Yun, and various centrist party and PLA leaders. The likely presence there of Hu and Zhao, despite their earlier lack of much support independent from that of Deng, would be due to such political progress as they would have made to that date, recognition of their implicit succession status, the lieutenants they had succeeded in bringing in to senior posts, the fact that Hu and Zhao (with Deng) had been succeeding in filling up the center of Chinese politics fairly well, and the general reluctance of all on the Chinese scene to revive the extreme politics that marked the Cultural Revolution years and the prolonged succession struggle that went on for years during Mao's long decline.

37. It follows that the longer Deng remains in place, the greater the chances that Hu, Zhao, and like-minded pragmatists will dominate the succession. Deng also has stated that he hopes to retire from active politics by 1985. If by about that time Deng has been able to maintain at least his present degree of authority, then the most probable transfer of political authority would be one in which Hu and Zhao (or others picked by Deng) would succeed to a primus inter pares type of leadership situation. Should such a scenario take place, it should be noted, this would constitute the only successfully arranged political succession in China in this century.

38. No confident estimates are justified as to what would occur then, for, in addition to the domestic and

foreign circumstances of the time, the question would soon arise as to whether the succession of Hu and Zhao was to be one of shared authority, or of one superior to the other partner, or of just one leader alone. There are countless precedents in Chinese history for just one leader, and some precedents (imperial, republican, and PRC) for a prime technician associated with the boss—the most recent example, Mao and Zhou Enlai. Zhao Ziyang has some of the makings of a Zhou Enlai. But Zhao is a tough, able official who might outlast Hu. One thing is clear: there are no examples in Chinese history of truly shared top authority.

39. In any event, the succession leadership would continue to face a fundamental agenda that in many respects would not be significantly different for some years from that of the present. Further, China's leadership—whether Hu and Zhao or others—will begin progressively to be one whose perspectives have been formed largely by post-1949 events. As compared with the generation that produced Mao, Zhou, and Deng, their prestige will tend to less, their power bases more institutional in nature, and their retention of leadership even more dependent on personal networks of power that can withstand setbacks suffered. A new generation of leaders somewhat deficient in charisma, legitimacy, and unity will tend at least initially to be cautious and bureaucratic, both in makeup and tactic. At the same time, as compared with Mao and his Long March generation, China's coming leaders will have been more exposed to technological and urban problems, as well as to the outside world. In any case, the generating of mass support for them and for their programs will be difficult in a situation where economic development, the centerpiece of the PRC's current policy package, will almost certainly proceed too slowly and distribute benefits too unevenly. Not least, elements within the PLA will probably remain a brake on social and political innovation, as well as the ultimate arbiter of civil disorder and, in extremis, perhaps of political succession itself.

40. Within this general context, ***the style and domestic policies*** of a Dengist-type succession would probably have the following tendencies:

- A leadership with a predisposition to gradualist policies forged through consensus. A government system marked by competition among rival institutions and interests, a more technical society.
- Continued nationalistic emphasis on "China" and the Chinese "motherland"; little faithfulness—other than lipservice—to ideology.
- But with ideological and conservative military cadres—keepers of the torch of orthodoxy, tradition, discipline, and stability—retaining sufficient residual influence to constitute continuing brakes on the nature and pace of reform.
- The unique PLA-party closeness, forged by war and revolution years ago, would continue to give way, with the new military leadership becoming more professional, and the political leaders making the military more of a state instrument.
- More provincial and local influence upon Beijing politics and policies.

41. If a Dengist succession indeed occurs, its ***foreign policies*** will resemble those of the present, but with these particular tendencies:

- An increase in the importance of security issues, as the gap widens between Chinese and Soviet military capabilities—and some of China's particular weapons systems continue to be outclassed by even those of Vietnam.
- A desire to avoid renewed border hostilities with either the USSR or Vietnam.
- A continuance of correct—but not cordial—relations with the United States: an arm's length partnership in which the question of Taiwan remains a divisive one, with continuing PRC criticisms of the United States and its policies, tough bargaining, and occasionally difficult Chinese behavior.
- A gradual increase in economic ties with the West, Europe, and Japan, to the limit of China's resources, but still constrained to limit substantial Western participation in China's economic life.
- Continuing Chinese emphasis on and rhetoric concerning Third World matters.
- Exploration of ways and means to lessen the present level of hostility with the USSR—but with no fundamental change in Beijing's basic anti-Soviet orientation.
  - There are small pockets of opinion or influence within China, which would champion the prac-

tical benefits of more normal relationships with the USSR, but there is no ambiguity in Chinese thinking about the character or aims of Soviet policy. Furthermore, Deng's opening to the United States and the West—with its concomitant explosion in emphasis upon English language training in China—is and will probably remain a basic national orientation for some time, despite certain present Chinese attacks on the "corrosive" effects of the "open door" to the United States and the West.

The only difference that can be found between them (Brezhnev and Soviet leadership) and the Czars is that limited by its strength. Czarist Russia sought hegemony in Europe; Soviet hegemonists, however . . . aimed at establishing their hegemony over the whole world.

Beijing's party journal, *Red Flag*, 1 September 1981

— Nonetheless, there appears to be a body of opinion among Chinese leaders (of various persuasions) that certain practical benefits would flow from a more normal relationship with the USSR, and that the present level of border hostility with the USSR must be lessened, if only to increase Chinese diplomatic flexibility. The influence of such opinion will probably grow somewhat, dependent as well on how ham-handed or subtle the policies of Brezhnev or his successors are toward China meanwhile; and, to lesser extent, on how Beijing can lessen the level of its hostility with the Soviets without jeopardizing any significant Chinese interests with Washington.

42. Over the next few years, the above prospects could vary significantly in the less likely event that critical setbacks should occur in development or security affairs—beyond the level or nature of those anticipated by Deng and his associates—which produced a backlash regime of some kind. Such a regime could be of varying makeup, possibly including even some of the present Dengists. The most extreme such case would be a backlash regime headed by Stalinist-type conservatives, possibly in association with a number of security service and certain senior PLA officers. The outlook for such a regime, or series of regimes, would probably be fairly bleak, having been born of critical national setbacks of some sort. Leadership stability and continuity would doubtless suffer. What remained of the Dengists would constitute the new oppositionists. In all, the PRC probably would have entered a new and extended time of troubles.

43. The ***style and domestic policies*** of backlash successor regimes might tend to these characteristics:

- No turning of the clock back to Cultural Revolution extremes, but greatly increased reliance on ideological orthodoxy and coercive power.
- A clear predisposition to favor the military and heavy industry at the expense of light industry and consumer concerns.
- Renewed emphasis on "red" at the expense of "expert." With this, a harsher treatment of China's intellectuals, scientists, and technicians—especially those with exposure to the West.
- A return to more intense leadership factionalism and instability.

44. The ***foreign policies*** of such backlash regimes might tend to these characteristics:

- The preservation of some ties to Western economic and technical support, but within an increased overall disposition favoring less foreign involvement. There would be greater reluctance in contracting for new plants and technology, in establishing rules for foreign participation in the development and exploitation of China's resources, and in sending students abroad for advanced study.
- A more xenophobic China.
- More truculent foreign policy rhetoric, though in the main continuing actual prudence.
- Compared with Dengist successors, a cooler relationship with the United States.
- Compared with Dengist successors, perhaps less chance of reducing the levels of hostility with the USSR.

D. Consequences for the United States

45. In general terms, many Chinese questions of significance for US interests can be expected to contin-

ue in more or less present patterns over the next few years almost regardless of which leaders—except extremist ideologues—come to dominate the succession in China. That country will be poor and will be developing only slowly. Population growth will press increasingly on the limited resources of China. Its leaders will wish the Chinese people to maintain less than full and meaningful economic and social contact with the outside world and with foreigners. Those leaders will probably not return China to Cultural Revolution patterns, nor will they alter the primacy of the party or China's basic authoritarian system. The pace and patterns of present development programs may shift from time to time, but those efforts will probably neither collapse China's economy nor produce a development miracle. Chinese politics and domestic policies will probably avoid extremes, held somewhat in check by still deeply felt wounds from the political past and by the inertia of China's vast bureaucracies. China's foreign policy will meanwhile remain fairly prudent: despite occasional loud beatings of gongs and cymbals, the country will remain too absorbed in its many domestic problems to be very interested in foreign adventurism. Its leaders will probably become more outspokenly independent, and will not hesitate to criticize numerous aspects of American life, style, and policy. Not least, the PRC will remain intensely nationalistic.

[The idea of China's ministers during the Opium War (1840-42) to] "use foreigners to overcome foreigners" was aimed at resisting foreign aggression, safeguarding national independence and achieving the aim of disintegrating the enemy by exploiting the contradiction between the aggressors and adopting different measures to deal with them in accordance with different conditions. . . . Undoubtedly, this strategy of "using foreigners to overcome foreigners" must be affirmed.

Beijing *Enlightenment Daily*, 23 November 1981

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46. The question of Taiwan will remain a special case of difficulty in Sino-US relations. Beijing's leaders—any leaders—will never give up their ambition to reunify Taiwan with the mainland. They consider that the revolution they won in 1949 remains unfulfilled as long as Taiwan has not been joined to the "motherland." Frustration continues because Taiwan is so near and yet so far—beyond the ability of the PRC to conquer or to cajole in the foreseeable future. The Taiwan question will also retain high importance to the PRC's leaders as a ready litmus of US intentions. Within this framework, there might be somewhat greater opportunity for Washington to resolve, finesse, or get by specific Taiwan problems with a pragmatic regime than with a Stalinist or extremist one of some kind.

On 1 February 1662, a large army led by our outstanding national hero Zheng Chenggong [Koxinga], with the keen cooperation of the people of Taiwan, drove away the Dutch aggressors that had occupied Taiwan for 38 years, thus bringing Taiwan back to the embrace of the motherland. . . . Anyone who wants to separate Taiwan from the mainland is hated by the people and cannot be forgiven.

Beijing *Worker's Daily*, 1 February 1982

There is no general feeling of great impatience concerning reunification with Taiwan. . . . The greatest desire of the Chinese people now is for better living conditions. Beijing leaders believe the most critical need is to improve the domestic situation.

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47. Taiwan apart, experience suggests that a regime dominated by Hu, Zhao, or similar pragmatists would probably benefit broad US interests more than would a more strident PRC:

- The Deng government is a relatively known commodity to the United States, at least as Chinese regimes go. A similar successor regime would tend to be also. American officials would probably have a better feel of what to expect in the way of Chinese conduct, as compared to less predictable and more unstable successor regimes.
- Despite occasional serious difficulties between Washington and Beijing, the strategic interests of

China will probably keep it and the USSR basically at odds for some years; there will continue to be areas of coincidence in Chinese and US interests during the period of this estimate; and Dengist successors would probably tend to continue to cooperate with the United States—albeit with many frictions—in various ways against a common Soviet adversary. Backlash Chinese successor regimes would almost certainly also be anti-Soviet, but their cooperativeness with the United States would doubtless be less.

- Such considerations would apply to those cases where the PRC and the United States are cooperating in the world: the value of the PRC's continuing opposition to Vietnamese and Soviet designs in Southeast Asia; PRC support of Pakistan and of Afghan resistance to Soviet invasion; PRC encouragement to Japan to resist Soviet pressures; and PRC restraining influence on North Korea.

- Some mutuality of interests between Beijing and Washington will apply, as well, concerning the continuance of certain economic, technological, and scholarly exchange benefits. These might well diminish were backlash regimes to come to power in China.

- As has been discussed, Dengist successors would probably be somewhat less difficult concerning the Taiwan question than would more strident Beijing regimes.

48. What the United States and other friendly outside powers can accomplish in affecting PRC politics and policies will be limited by numerous constraints:

- The basic primacy of Chinese domestic forces, as compared with foreign, in shaping so central a question as political succession.

- The relative poverty of China and the disinclination of its leaders to open up China too much to foreigners.

- The many realistic constraints on both China and the United States which make massive US economic or military assistance to the PRC unlikely.

- Our lack of detailed knowledge of the innermost workings of the Chinese system and, hence, the difficulty of predicting just how the content and the style of US policies will impact on PRC politics and policies.

49. Accordingly, the ability of the United States and its allies to influence China's political succession directly will doubtless be slight; our ability to affect Chinese policies will perhaps be somewhat greater. Even so, such outside powers' role will not necessarily be negligible. The greatest potential element of influence is perhaps negative in character: the ability of the content or style of American conduct inadvertently to injure the political positions of PRC leaders of interest to US policy, and so give the Soviets added opportunity to profit from the situation. As for positive influences, there may be many opportunities—economic, technical, diplomatic, military, exchanges, the private sector, and so on—where friendly international measures could affect the PRC's future. These could include bilateral as well as multilateral measures, as for example:

- Added contact with, invitations to, and exchanges for political leaders other than the top few—to protect US interests and broaden US influence and options for the future.

- Similar expanded relations with middle-level PRC defense figures.

- Similar expanded relations with PRC scholars and technicians studying abroad, and especially those who are children of or close to very senior Chinese leaders.

- Encouragement to friendly governments in expanding contacts with China—especially where these actors may be free of certain constraining influences on US conduct.

- Small-scale, carefully tailored international technical aid programs, possibly including some concessional projects.

- Expanded international credits.

50. It will be of considerable consequence to the United States—and to China—that political succession in the PRC will not be taking place in a vacuum, but in parallel with an accompanying succession process in the USSR. Brezhnev's successors may well be as basically hostile to—and greatly concerned about—China as are he and the present Soviet Government. The next collegium of Soviet leaders may prove more willing

than Brezhnev has been to overcome strong constraints and make small concessions that would save face for the Chinese and so facilitate a lowering of the level of Sino-Soviet hostility. Certainly Brezhnev and his successors will attempt to fish in any troubled waters of Chinese succession, and particularly so if China experiences critical setbacks and heightened political instability.

51. In the final analysis, even though Beijing's leaders will continue to see the American connection as a necessary adjunct to the PRC's development efforts, the value to them of that connection will continue to hang importantly on their perceptions of the degree to which US world policies vis-a-vis the USSR benefit the PRC's security and strategic interests.

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Annex A

Selected Biographies

Deng Xiaoping

Vice Chairman, Chinese Communist Party; Chairman, Military Commission, Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party

Deng Xiaoping is the most powerful man in China, even though he is ranked third in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) hierarchy. Purged by Mao Zedong three times (1932, 1966, and 1976), he returned to power because of his tenacity, his broad network of political supporters, and the need for his administrative ability.

Deng has been the driving force in China's modernization effort. Since his last rehabilitation in 1977, he has successfully limited the influence of those committed to Mao's ideals and replaced them with capable, energetic, and pragmatic persons like himself, thus establishing a basis for long-term political continuity and stability. Not a dictator, he has stressed the need for collective decisionmaking and political discipline in order to dampen ruthless infighting.

Early Career

Deng was born in 1904 in Sichuan into a fairly well-to-do family. As a student during the early 1920s, he was active in Chinese Communist affairs in France, where he came in contact with others who would become prominent figures in the CCP. He returned to China in 1926 after spending several months in the Soviet Union. A veteran of the Long March (1934-35), Deng subsequently served in the military until 1949, when he was appointed a secretary of the party's Southwest Bureau, headquartered in Sichuan. In 1952 he moved to Beijing to become a vice premier and a member of the State Planning Commission. The following year he was named Minister of Finance and a vice chairman of the Finance and Economics Commission of the central government.

During the mid-1950s Deng rose meteorically in the party. By 1955 he had become a member of the Politburo and Secretary General of the CCP in charge of organizations subordinate to the Central Committee. In 1956 he was promoted from lowest ranking member on a Politburo of 13 to sixth ranking on a Politburo of 17 and a member of its Standing Committee. He was also named General Secretary of the Secretariat, a body whose authority eventually rivaled Mao's.

During the 1950s and 1960s Deng became increasingly active in foreign affairs, particularly with other Communist parties. He was a major representative of the CCP at critical meetings with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. As the relationship between the two parties soured, he became a strong, outspoken opponent of Soviet policies.

Purge and Rehabilitation

Deng was the second-highest victim of the Cultural Revolution (1966-69). Purged in 1966, he reappeared in 1973 at a state banquet with his old title of Vice Premier. A secret party meeting later that year elevated him to the Politburo. In 1975 he was elected a vice chairman of the CCP and was also named vice chairman of the party Military Commission and chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army, posts that gave him more influence over the military than he had had before the Cultural Revolution.

In April 1976 Deng again was removed from all his posts, the victim of the Gang of Four. The following September Mao died and the gang was arrested, thereby paving the way in July 1977 for Deng to regain the positions he had lost in the previous year. Since then, Deng has maneuvered to isolate govern-

ment and party officials who benefited at his expense during the Cultural Revolution, most notably CCP Vice Chairman Hua Guofeng. He orchestrated Hua's decline while rejecting the top government and party posts for himself, choosing instead to install hand-picked successors. Deng resigned as chief of staff in February 1980 and as Vice Premier the following September. He officially assumed Hua's position as chairman of the Military Commission in June 1981, six months after he took de facto control of the military away from Hua.

Hu Yaobang

Chairman and General Secretary, Chinese Communist Party

Hu Yaobang is one of Chinese Communist Party Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping's most trusted associates. In February 1980 he was appointed a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and general secretary in charge of the then newly reestablished CCP Secretariat. He replaced Hua Guofeng as Chairman of the CCP in June 1981, thereby capping his rapid rise in the party hierarchy. As General Secretary and party Chairman, Hu holds an unprecedented combination of posts that allows him to supervise both the formulation and implementation of CCP policy. According to a provision in the Chinese Constitution, the party chairman also commands the armed forces. In a break with recent practice, however, Hu did not concurrently assume the position of chairman of the CCP Military Commission, in part because important military leaders lack confidence in him.

An expert on CCP affairs, Hu has held a wide variety of party positions during the past five years that have allowed him to supervise the consolidation of operational control of the party in the hands of the Dengist reformers and to reduce the influence of leftist elements. As director of the CCP Organization Department from December 1977 until January 1979, he supervised the rehabilitation of thousands of officials who had been purged during the Cultural Revolution (1966-69). He was a vice president of the party school from 1977 at least until he became CCP Chairman, and he also served as director of the Propaganda Department from December 1978 until February 1980. He has been third secretary of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission and a member of the Politburo since December 1978.

Career

Hu, the son of poor peasants, was born in 1915 in Hunan. His career has paralleled that of his mentor, Deng. They have known each other since at least the early 1940s, when Hu served as a political commissar and director of an Army political department under Deng's command. During 1949-52 both men held party posts in Sichuan Province. They then transferred to Beijing—Deng as a vice premier and Hu as head of the Communist Youth League. Hu subsequently concentrated on youth affairs with only a brief interruption during 1964-65, when he was first secretary of the Shaanxi provincial CCP committee.

Hu was purged during the Cultural Revolution, primarily because of his close association with Deng. In 1972 Hu returned to public life as a member of the National People's Congress Standing Committee. By 1975 he was managing the Chinese Academy of Sciences. He had also assumed responsibilities in culture and education in order to undermine leftist control in these areas. Purged again by leftists in the

1976 struggle for power to succeed Mao Zedong, Hu was rehabilitated in March 1977. From 1979 until 1980 he served as secretary general of the CCP.

Zhao Ziyang

Premier; Vice Chairman, Chinese Communist Party

Zhao Ziyang replaced Hua Guofeng as Premier in September 1980 and was named the third-ranking Chinese Communist Party (CCP) vice chairman the following June. His political career in the past few years has been characterized by extraordinarily frequent promotions in the government and party hierarchies. Named a vice premier in April 1980, Zhao almost immediately assumed Hua's responsibility for managing the daily affairs of government as "executive vice premier." He was elected an alternate member of the Politburo in August 1977, a full member in September 1979, and a member of the body's Standing Committee in February 1980. In May 1982 he became the chairman of the newly formed Standing Committee of the State Council and Minister in Charge of the State Commission for Restructuring the Economy.

Career

Zhao was born in Henan in 1919 into a landlord-class family. He joined the CCP in 1938, and until 1950 he was a local party secretary in various places in and around Henan Province. During 1950-55 Zhao held several positions in the South China Subbureau of the CCP Central Committee, headquartered in Guangzhou. When the subbureau was abolished in 1955, he was appointed to provincial party and government posts in Guangdong Province. In 1956 he was promoted to the secretariat of the provincial party committee and was named a secretary of the Guangdong Military District party committee. By 1965 he had become first secretary of the provincial party committee, secretary of the Central-South Bureau, and political commissar of the Guangdong Military District.

Purged in 1967 during the Cultural Revolution, Zhao reappeared in 1971 as a secretary of the Nei Monggol regional party committee and vice chairman of the Nei Monggol regional revolutionary committee. In early 1972 he moved to Guangdong, where by 1974 he had become provincial first secretary and chairman of the revolutionary committee, first political commissar of the military district, and political commissar of the Guangzhou Military Region. In December 1975 Zhao was transferred to Sichuan as first secretary. The following month he became the chairman of the revolutionary committee and first political commissar of the Chengdu Military Region.

Chen Yun

Vice Chairman, Chinese Communist Party; First Secretary, Central Discipline Inspection Commission (since December 1978)



Ye Jianying

Chairman, National People's Congress; Vice Chairman, Military Commission, Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party; Vice Chairman, Chinese Communist Party

Since being restored in December 1978 to the high political status he had enjoyed 20 years earlier, Chen Yun has become China's elder statesman for economic affairs and a major figure in the development of current economic policy. The Chinese press has linked him to Chinese Communist Party Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping in terms of prestige. Chen has supported Deng's efforts to reform the CCP and reduce corruption and incompetence. At times, however, he has been somewhat at odds with Deng's reform plans when they have affected the economy.

Chen has been an outspoken advocate of giving priority in economic planning to the needs of consumers and of stressing balance in economic development. He has played a key role in adjusting economic policies that have reduced the growth of heavy industry and increased the growth of agriculture and light industry. Because his health is poor, Chen is not involved in daily management decisions.

Chen was born in Jiangsu in 1905. Active in CCP affairs since the 1920s, he rose to become the ranking vice premier by 1954 and a member of the Politburo Standing Committee in 1956. In 1958 Mao Zedong launched the Great Leap Forward, an ambitious program to produce rapid economic growth. Chen criticized Mao's policies as unrealistic, and his political influence began to erode. Denounced during the Cultural Revolution (1966-69), he lost his membership on the Politburo and his vice-premiership. In July 1979 he was reappointed vice premier and became the minister in charge of the influential State Financial and Economic Commission. He resigned as vice premier in September 1980. The Commission was dissolved in March 1981.

As Chairman of the National People's Congress since March 1978, Ye Jianying is the de facto head of state. He had previously been in charge of the Ministry of National Defense since 1971. He has been a vice chairman of the Chinese Communist Party since August 1973.

Along with CCP Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping and others, Ye was an opponent of the extreme leftist Gang of Four during the struggle for power in 1976. He nonetheless subsequently opposed Deng's efforts to demote Mao Zedong's chosen successor, Hua Guofeng, and to denigrate Mao's ideas and achievements. Ye enjoys great prestige and has a broad network of supporters that may represent much of the opposition to Deng's reform efforts. However, Ye apparently now endorses Deng's succession arrangements and accepts a reduced political role for himself.

Ye was born in 1898 in Guangdong into a wealthy merchant family. He has studied in Singapore, Hanoi, the Soviet Union, and Germany. Ye has been a CCP member since the mid-1920s and has taken part in many historic military campaigns, including the Long March (1934-35). He has held posts in the military, party, and government. He was made a marshal of the People's Liberation Army in 1955. In 1966 Ye was named a member of the CCP Secretariat, becoming the only active military officer on that body. By 1967 he had become a member of the Politburo and a vice chairman of the Military Commission. Attacked during the Cultural Revolution (1966-69), he nevertheless retained his official positions.

Li Xiannian

Vice Chairman, Chinese Communist Party (since August 1977)

Hua Guofeng

Vice Chairman, Chinese Communist Party

One of China's most senior economic specialists, Li Xiannian has been a member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since 1954; only the invalid Liu Bocheng has served as long a continuous term on the Politburo. Similarly, in terms of continuous service, Li was the most senior vice premier when he resigned in September 1980 after 24 years in that post. During his career he has developed a strong personal following in the government and the party. As a result, he has been an important figure in the political maneuvering that has taken place since Mao Zedong's death in 1976. Li represents a politically orthodox strain in China's leadership that has been at odds with some of the more liberal reform policies of CCP Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping. There is no firm evidence, however, that he has seriously contended for China's top government or party posts.

Li has been a major figure in China's economic establishment since 1954, when he began a 21-year assignment as Minister of Finance. He lost some prestige as an economist, however, after another economist, Chen Yun, became a CCP vice chairman in December 1978. Li's economic development strategy, which emphasizes rapid growth of heavy industry, has been in large part supplanted by Chen's policy of stressing consumer industry. Since late 1981, however, heavy industry has received some new emphasis.

Li was born in Hubei in 1905. He joined the CCP and entered the military service in the 1920s. He fought with Communist main force and guerrilla units until 1948, when he left the military and became Governor of Hubei Province. He remained in Hubei until his transfer to Beijing in 1954.

Hua Guofeng was demoted from Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party to the most junior of six vice chairmen in June 1981, when Hu Yaobang replaced him. His demotion was part of a drawn-out process orchestrated by CCP Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping to reduce the power of Hua and other leftists. Sharply criticized at the time he was demoted, Hua currently has no known substantive responsibilities and makes only rare public appearances. He appears to have no power base that he can easily mobilize to his advantage. He remains a symbol, however, for the many members of the CCP who, like him, were promoted as a result of the Cultural Revolution (1966-69) and are now being demoted.

Hua was born in 1921 in Shanxi into a poor family. In the early 1950s he was a party secretary in Mao Zedong's home district in Hunan Province, and by 1958 he had become a provincial vice governor. He was not criticized during the Cultural Revolution. Subsequently he was elected to the CCP Central Committee and became First Secretary of the Hunan CCP committee.

Hua arrived in Beijing in 1971 and two years later gained a seat on the Politburo. In 1975 he became a vice premier and the Minister of Public Security. Said to be Mao's personally chosen successor, Hua became Premier, Chairman of the CCP, and chairman of the party Military Commission in 1976. He is the only person in the history of the People's Republic of China to have held the top party, government, and military posts concurrently. In September 1980 Hua was replaced as Premier. Later that year he was relieved of the duties of chairman of the CCP Military Commission, and he formally lost the title in June 1981.

Wan Li

Vice Premier; Member, Secretariat, Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party

Wan Li is China's senior vice premier and one of its top economic decisionmakers. He became a member of the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee in February 1980, after having served as First Secretary of the Anhui CCP committee since June 1977. In April 1980 he was appointed a vice premier. He was Minister in Charge of the State Agricultural Commission from July 1980 until it was abolished in May 1982. During 1981 and at least part of 1982 Wan was head of a State Council working group that oversaw the implementation of national economic policies and arbitrated disputes over the allocation of resources.

Wan was born in 1916 in Shandong. He has been associated with CCP Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping since 1950, when he worked under Deng's supervision in Sichuan Province. He is one of Deng's most effective political troubleshooters. He has also worked closely with CCP Chairman Hu Yaobang. As a result of Wan's no-nonsense dealings with opponents of Deng's policies, he has earned a reputation for being tough minded and pragmatic.

After serving in key posts in the Ministries of Building and Urban Construction (1952-58) and as CCP secretary and vice mayor of Beijing (1958-66), Wan was purged during the Cultural Revolution (1966-69). He returned to Beijing in 1971, and by 1974 he had resumed his former posts in the Beijing municipal organizations. He was appointed Minister of Railways in 1975, only to disappear in April 1976, when Deng was purged. He reappeared in October, shortly after the arrest of the leftist Gang of Four. He served as a vice minister of light industry from January until June 1977, when he became the top CCP and government official in Anhui Province.

Geng Biao

State Councilor; Minister of National Defense; Member, Standing Committee, Military Commission, and Member, Politburo, Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party

Yang Dezhi

Chief of Staff, People's Liberation Army; Vice Minister of National Defense; Member, Standing Committee, Military Commission, and Member, Secretariat, Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party (since February 1980)

A former Army officer and diplomat, Geng Biao became China's first civilian Minister of National Defense in March 1981, despite the objections of senior military officers, who preferred someone from senior active-duty ranks. He has been a member of the Politburo since August 1977. Geng was a vice premier from March 1978 until May 1982 when he was named a State Councilor. From early 1979 until July 1981 Geng served as secretary general of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Military Commission. As Minister of National Defense, he retains a position on the Standing Committee of the commission but devotes most of his time to the demanding, although largely ceremonial and administrative, duties of the Ministry.

Geng shares CCP Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping's views on defense-related matters. Both favor the professionalization and modernization of China's armed forces but assign it a lower priority than the development of the civilian economy. Both men agree on the importance of Sino-US relations, and Geng has been China's key spokesman in exchanges with US defense officials.

Geng was born in 1909 in Hunan. He was a military officer for 20 years before beginning a long, successful career as a diplomat in 1950. At various times during 1950-71 he served as Ambassador to Sweden, Denmark, and Finland; Pakistan; Burma; and Albania. During 1960-63 he was a vice minister of foreign affairs. He served as director of the International Liaison Department of the CCP Central Committee from 1971 until 1978.

Since assuming his current posts Yang Dezhi has become the single most influential and powerful active duty officer in the People's Liberation Army (PLA). His membership on two major policymaking bodies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Secretariat and the Military Commission, enables him to articulate the concerns of the military at the highest levels of government and to guide the general development of Chinese defense policy. As Chief of Staff and as a vice minister of defense, he implements policy and manages the daily workings of the military establishment.

Yang shares authority over military affairs with CCP Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping, who also chairs the Military Commission; Yang Shangkun, the Secretary General of the Military Commission; and Minister of National Defense, Geng Biao. Since becoming China's leading military officer, Yang has consistently counseled the PLA against resistance to Deng's reformist policies and has called for absolute military obedience to party pronouncements.

Yang was born in 1910 in Hunan. A veteran of the Long March (1934-35), he also served in the Sino-Japanese War (1937-45), the Chinese civil war (1945-49), and the Korean war (1950-53). From 1958 until 1980 Yang served successively as commander of the Jinan Military Region, the Wuhan Military Region, and the Kunming Military Region. His most recent combat experience was as deputy commander of China's forces during the brief Sino-Vietnamese war in early 1979.













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

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